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Abstract 
While being structurally subordinate, prisoners are neither powerless, nor mute. Drawing 
on semi-ethnographic research in a Ukrainian medium-security prison for men, in this 
article, I advance the concept of ‘negative visibility’, i.e. an administration’s fear of 
external attention and intervention, and make a case for the interplay of prisoner resistance 
with a managerial culture. Using Soviet penal and managerial legacies as an example, I 
argue that structure can be both constraining and enabling even within the milieu of the 
gross power imbalance of which prison is an archetype, thereby attesting to the coherence 
of agency and structure and the contingency of power. Furthermore, by highlighting that 
prisoners may undermine officer power for all sorts of reasons, including opportunistic and 
selfish, this study cautions against romanticising the ‘defences of the weak’ and a priori 
politicisation of prisoner resistance.  
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Introduction 
Prisons constitute debilitating (Kauffman, 1988), brutal and coercive places (Scraton, Sim, 
and Skidmore, 1991). Within them, people’s rights and dignities may be suspended 
(Liebling, 2004). Men, women, and children may endure physical, sexual, and emotional 
abuse (Othmani, 2008), pain (Christie, 1978), fear (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012), 
‘illegitimate patriarchalism’ (Mathiesen, 1965), stagnation (Ugelvik, 2014), numerous 
deprivations (Sykes, 1958), and deterioration, depersonalisation, and suffering (Cohen and 
Taylor, 1972).  
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Nonetheless, in his seminal work, The Defences of the Weak, Mathiesen (1965) 
convincingly argues that despite an inherent and radical power inequality, prisoners are not 
powerless mutes and manage to ‘defend’ themselves. Although Foucault's ‘where there is 
power, there is resistance’ (1978: 95) may sound trite, compelling evidence from around 
the world demonstrates that prisoners, to various degrees of intent and efficacy, contest and 
circumvent officers’ ‘cracked’ power (Sykes, 1958; inter alia, Akoensi, 2014; Bosworth 
and Carrabine, 2001; Cloward, 1960; Crewe, 2009; Karklins, 1989; Khlevniuk, 2004; 
McDermott and King, 1988; Pallot and Piacentini, 2012; Thomas, 1984; Ugelvik, 2014).  
At the same time, however, and notwithstanding the plethora of global data, we 
know little about the interplay of localised political culture and prisoner resistance. In 
particular, there is scarce information about how prisoner resistance operates within 
Central European institutions, following the collapse of the authoritarian Leninist regimes. 
In this article, I work to fill this gap by advancing the concept of ‘negative visibility’ 
(Thomas, 1984), by which I mean the prison administrators’ fear of external attention and 
intervention, in order to highlight the coherence of a political climate and prisoner 
resistance.  
Drawing on a semi-ethnographic case study in a Ukrainian medium-security prison 
for men, I discuss how these prisoners engaged the Soviet legacy of a scapegoating culture 
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to circumvent and fend off prison officer power (henceforth officer power). Whilst mindful 
of the inherent limitations of a case study design, I argue that notwithstanding the 
structural determinants of the gross power disparity, amplified by Ukraine’s totalitarian 
past and current struggles to give human rights real meaning, the interactional nature of 
power means that neither officers nor prisoners are completely or permanently powerful or 
powerless. In their interactions, men assess, utilise, and reconstitute structures that can 
equally constrain and promote their actions. 
 
Prisons as power places 
Not all prisoners are created equal, but all react, as agents, to penal power in general and 
prison officers in particular. The concept of agency captures the complex ways in which 
people are reflexive of their human condition and always could have acted otherwise in a 
given situation (Giddens, 1984). Power, in prison as elsewhere, operates at two levels: 
first, power-as-domination constitutes an organising force of social order – through 
ideology, tradition, culture, law and its enforcement apparatus, economy, socialisation, and 
other stabilising, routinising, and – importantly – enduring mechanisms (Garland, 1990; 
Giddens, 1984; Scott, 2001; Smith, 2008; Weber, 1962). Second, power represents a 
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relationship among people in situ whereby one side can exercise its will against the will of 
the others (Weber, 1962; see Gangas, 2016 on capabilities versus capacities).  
Structure and agency cohere and connect: the former, as an external factor, shapes 
the behaviour and resources (including available meanings) of agents, whilst agents give 
meaning to, reproduce, challenge, shape, and alter structures (Giddens, 1984; Rubin, 2017; 
Smith, 2008). This dialectic requires two disclaimers. First, social commentators tend to 
equate agency with resistance. In her critique of this tendency, Rubin (2017) accurately 
observes that by implying or expecting that agency must repel structure, these scholars, 
perhaps unintentionally, deny agency to those who accept existing structures (see also 
Crewe, 2009). Second, following from the first, structure may constrain and enable alike 
(Gangas, 2016; Giddens, 1984; Rubin, 2017). In prison, although generally constraining, 
structure nonetheless can assist prisoners in augmenting agency and self-worth, serving as 
a source for the reimagination and reinvention of people’s identity (e.g. Bosworth and 
Slade, 2014; Ghorashi et al., 2017; Symkovych, 2017a; Ugelvik, 2014). Furthermore, 
whilst prison administrators wield significant power, they themselves face a threat of 
chastisement and even removal if higher authorities deem them not being in control. Thus, 
prison authorities often feel apprehensive of external attention or intervention, and 
prisoners exploit this fear of ‘negative visibility’ in their contestation and circumvention of 
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officer power (Calavita and Jenness, 2014; Martin, 2014; Symkovych, 2018; Thomas, 
1984). 
Prisoners exercise agency and use structure differently and for a myriad reasons 
and purposes: actively and passively, dissentingly and obediently, consciously and 
otherwise, intentionally and unintentionally, collectively and individually, meaningfully 
and not, quietly and disruptively. Conversely, officers and prison administrations in 
general may be cognisant, oblivious, or indifferent to prisoner (re)actions, and, 
consequently, adjust or not their power in response (Bosworth and Carrabine, 2001; 
Hollander and Einwohner, 2004; Mathiesen, 1965; Rubin, 2015, 2017; Scott, 2001; 
Wrong, 2004). Prisoners react not only to penal power and imprisonment in general, but 
also to concrete institutions, and such reactions, including lasting adjustments, coping, 
resistance, and adaptations, predicate on an array of factors – personal (e.g. biographical, 
psychological, identity), as well as institutional (e.g. regime, architecture, officers and 
other prisoners) (Cohen and Taylor, 1972; Crewe, 2009; King and Elliott, 1977). In 
essence, prisoner reactions stem from the need to assert their subjective identity, to 
maintain autonomy and a measure of control (agency), to improve their lives, or 
sometimes, merely to survive in a brutal and totalising environment (Bosworth, 1996; 
Bosworth and Carrabine, 2001; Cohen and Taylor, 1972; Crewe, 2009; Ghorashi et al., 
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2017; Goffman, 1961; Karklins, 1989; Martin, 2014; Mathiesen, 1965; Pallot and 
Piacentini, 2012; Reed, 2003; Ugelvik, 2014).  
Equally, prisoner reaction to penal power in the form of ‘frictions’ may often be 
normal, sometimes almost reflexive and automatic human behaviour devoid of political 
intentions or special psychological significance (Rubin, 2015; see Carrabine [2005: 908] 
on ‘libidinal attractions of transgressing’).1 In sum, prisoner reactions to prison and prison 
officers form a rich diversity, ‘with different meanings, causes, and effects’ (Rubin, 2015: 
25), at times ‘superficially similar yet substantially different’ (Hollander and Einwohner, 
2004: 543). Inevitably, we must be selective in what we study and report. In this article, I 
limit the analysis to tactics of contesting the officer power that prisoners and officers alike 
considered consequential, i.e. intentional, overt resistance recognised by prisoners, 
officers, and me as an observer (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004). By using the concept of 
‘negative visibility’, I illuminate the interplay of a managerial culture with prisoner 
resistance. 
 
Soviet legacies and post-Soviet realities 
Ukraine’s penal regimes draw together totalitarian legacies and the state’s liberalising 
efforts. The country has undertaken extensive reforms, granting prisoners major rights and 
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allowing local and international inspectors, as well as volunteers, into its prisons. Along 
with losing control of 20,000 prisoners in 29 prisons following the Russian occupation of 
Crimea and the East in 2014, Ukraine has recently reduced threefold its prison population 
to fewer than 60,000. However, because of cultural attachment (Garland, 1990; Smith, 
2008) and the country’s dire financial straits, many Soviet legacies persist (see Pallot, 
2015). A militaristic and overcentralised organisation of the prison system, its managerial 
culture of evasion of responsibility and displacement of blame, barrack-style collectivist 
housing of prisoners, framing prisoner labour as a marker of rehabilitation and compliance, 
and an overreliance on prisoner-trustees in prison management represent the major relics of 
Soviet penality (see Symkovych, 2017b; 2018). The Gulag still serves as a reference point 
for reformers, (a fortiori ‘Western’) commentators, and even people working and living in 
the Ukrainian prison system (see Oleinik, 2003; Pallot and Piacentini, 2012; Piacentini and 
Slade, 2015).  
Prison inspections depict health care in Ukrainian prisons as abysmal, prison 
infrastructure as often broken beyond repair, and report localised overcrowding, albeit 
mostly in remand prisons, that severe understaffing exacerbates. Despite continuous 
liberalisation, some prison policies and practices remain anachronistically over-restrictive 
(CAT, 2017; CPT, 2017). That 12.6% of all European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, 
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2018a) cases in 2017 came from Ukraine attests to both the growing rights consciousness 
among Ukrainians and the lack of the rule of law in Ukraine.2 One of many disjunctions 
between rights-in-law and rights-in-practice lies in the Ukraine’s frequent failure to 
properly investigate and prosecute human rights violations in its prisons, including 
suspicious deaths in custody (CPT, 2017). As a ‘near democracy’ (Karstedt, 2013) still 
emerging from Soviet totalitarianism, Ukraine constitutes an anomic environment whereby 
many people who have already embraced the rights that endow their citizenship must deal 
with a state whose laws, institutions, and street-level bureaucrats do not always 
acknowledge the new normative expectations of ordinary citizens, including prisoners. The 
2013-2014 mass protests, known as the Maidan or Revolution of Dignity, epitomised this 
disjunction and the unwillingness of many to accept it. These events marked further 
departure from the Gulag legacy of legal nihilism, passivity, and resignation in the face of 
state violence, as well as Ukraine’s increasing distinctiveness among other post-Soviet 
societies (see Erpylyeva, 2018; Khlevniuk, 2015). 
 
The research site and methods  
This discussion draws on five months of participant observation and informal 
conversations in a medium-security prison (‘strict regime’ in the former Soviet and modern 
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Russian taxonomy) for sentenced men in the Kyiv region of Ukraine. Following two years 
of arduous access negotiations, the Ukrainian Penitentiary Service (UkrPS) allowed a 
study in this ‘model’ prison that served as a testing ground for new practices. The UkrPS 
exposed officers from other Ukrainian prisons to these practices as a means of 
dissemination during their initial and refresher courses at the nearby Training Academy. 
The typical topography of a medium-security prison (‘correctional colony’) meant that the 
prison’s secure compound encompassed a vast industrial zone with various workshops and 
an attached residential zone. This was further subdivided into local zones, each housing 
several squads of about 50 prisoners each (see Pallot and Piacentini, 2012 on otryad).  
The prison population of 800 comprised predominantly recidivists, mostly from 
Kyiv and the surrounding region (cf. Pallot and Piacentini, 2012 on coercive mobilisation 
in Russia). Severely understaffed, on a normal day, the prison had around 20-30 uniformed 
officers inside the secure compound. Officers belonged to one of four departments with 
specific duties and roles. Armed guards monitored the external perimeter and incoming 
parcels but did not enter the secure compound. Patrols, equipped with batons, handcuffs, 
radios, and mace sprays, policed the secure compound. Security officers gathered 
intelligence, whilst squad supervisors acted as case managers. 
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My fieldwork entailed daily visits, including weekends and holidays. Initially 
within sight of an officer and increasingly on my own, I mingled relatively freely in the 
workshops, dormitories, local zones (exercise yards), and the trans-zone checkpoint, 
chatting with people and observing daily life (cf. Pallot and Piacentini, 2012 on 
omnipresent minders and other challenges of independent research in Russian prisons). A 
native Ukrainian, I conversed in Ukrainian or Russian, depending on the interlocutor. As I 
discuss elsewhere, my authenticity, ad hoc resolution of moral dilemmas, and my 
independence from the authorities3 (who subjected me to a prolonged and humiliating 
quest for research authorisation, occasionally suspending my access afterwards) won me a 
measure of sympathy and trust from prisoners and officers alike (Symkovych, 2017a; 
2017b). Because many prisoners and officers appointed themselves as my informal guides 
into the complex prison world, I quickly mastered the prison’s practical norms, its jargon, 
and power dynamics. Many prisoners and officers invited me to their informal gatherings 
and shared food and drink, suggesting general acceptance. Eventually, I managed to speak 
to about a third of the prisoners and almost all officers.  
Additionally, I attended daily staff briefings and various other meetings, such as a 
regular prisoner grievance forum with an overseeing prosecutor. I also selected 20 
prisoners and 21 members of staff (including the prison commander) for semi-structured 
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interviews to explore in depth the salient themes that emerged during informal 
conversations and observations. The interviewees represented the identified diversity of 
views, prison experiences, and positions that existed in formal and informal hierarchies. As 
I lived with officers in the Training Academy, we discussed my emerging findings daily 
together with their experiences in prisons across Ukraine. 
Data analysis entailed a review of field notes and recordings of conversations and 
semi-structured interviews to assess the themes and patterns first identified in the extant 
literature and those that emerged from observations and conversations (see Bottoms, 2007; 
Pallot and Piacentini, 2012). The thematic analysis involved assessment of the themes’ 
frequency (magnitude) and their intensity, i.e. their deduced relevance to research 
participants gauged through the participants’ choice of words, tones, and other signifiers 
(Berg, 2001; see Cohen and Taylor, 1972 on collaborative research and Berger, 2001 on 
ethnography as a joint production).  
 
The dynamics of ‘negative visibility’ and ‘the defences of the weak’: Structurated and 
structurating prisoner contestations  
The prisoners in my study reacted to officer power in manifold ways, sometimes accepting, 
but often undermining it through trivial frictions or concerted resistance to which they 
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attached important, political meanings. Focusing here on the latter case, I use the following 
taxonomy of prisoner power vis-à-vis officers: official grievances, force, and coercion 
(Bachman, Bowers, and Marcus, 1968; Hepburn, 1985; Kauffman, 1988; Scott, 2001; 
Wrong, 2004). Obviously, neither ideal nor exhaustive,4 not least because the power 
nomenclature tends to centre on those in dominant rather than subordinate positions, this 
taxonomy captures the most significant and consequential, for officers and prisoners alike, 
strategies and tactics of prisoner ‘defence’ against structurally more powerful officers. 
While typical across jurisdictions, I argue that these forms of prisoner resistance can be 
coloured by a local political climate. The concept of ‘negative visibility’ allows us to 
explain how structurally disempowered agents manage to reconstitute structure for their 
own benefit by exploiting the Soviet legacy of scapegoating; that is, the administrators’ 
evasion of responsibility and hierarchical displacement of blame. Thus, despite the 
totalitarian past and the embryonic rule of law, the prisoners were capable of contesting 
officer power by engaging the administrators’ fear of ‘negative visibility’, thereby attesting 
to the coherence of agency and structure and the contingency of power. 
  
Official grievances 
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Prisons struggle to reconcile control priorities with the recognition of prisoners as right-
bearing subjects (Calavita and Jenness, 2014). As part of its ‘de-Communisation’ and 
‘Europeanisation’ projects, Ukraine has been expanding the rights of its citizens, including 
its prisoners. The Constitution of Ukraine (1996) guarantees everyone the right to appeal, 
including to the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson, any decisions and 
(in)actions of state bodies and their personnel. It allows citizens to defend their rights ‘in 
any other manner which is not explicitly prohibited by the law’ (Article 55). Equally with 
other jurisdictions, whilst few officers or prisoners in my study denied that prisoners are 
humans with some rights, the exercise of these rights often attracted disapproval and 
censure (see Calavita and Jenness, 2014).  
This uneasiness, and the administration’s palpable efforts to avoid prisoners 
appealing to outside bodies, suggest that, first, official grievances could undermine officer 
power, and second, that the administrators preferred to avoid ‘negative visibility’. The 
prisoners taking this contestation route usually explained their motives through the 
discourses of rights, justice, and fairness (normative expectations). This prisoner, about 40 
years old and with several served custodial sentences in the past, highlighted not only his 
resolution to assert his rights and human worth through official grievances but also the 
15 
 
shifting power balance within prison, perhaps reflective of broader changes in the country 
of ‘near democracy’: 
 
I don’t submit grievances because I have nothing else to engage myself with. And I 
am well aware that the administration doesn’t like it, [that] it will start pressurising 
me – not necessarily overtly. But they need to be constantly reminded that we are 
not animals, have rights, and that they are not czars and gods [or] above the law 
[…] They respond by pressurising because they know that they have violated the 
rules, prisoner rights, and that they can be punished [for this] by those above them. 
They may like to think they are gods, but they are not, not even czars. The Gulag 
times are gone. (Prisoner) 
 
These prisoners insisted on the limits of officer power (what Tamanaha, 2004 considers a 
constituent of the rule of law) and considered it their duty to resist any encroachment or 
abuse of power by administrators. Although the prisoners rarely disapproved of those 
engaged in ‘naming, blaming, and claiming’ (Calavita and Jenness, 2014), despite its 
potential threat to the status quo of peace (Symkovych, 2018), they regarded these 
bureaucratic quests more as legitimate leisure with a tint of eccentricity than as a form of 
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resistance. The inertial totalitarian legacy of the collusion between state branches, blended 
with the prisoner undeserving status (Khlevniuk, 2004; Piacentini and Katz, 2017), 
partially explains this scepticism. One prisoner from central Ukraine told me about police 
physical abuse he experienced during his arrest there and cautioned about the signal 
divergence of the law-on-the-books and law-in-action:  
 
Don’t be fooled that there is a [overseeing] prosecutor here weekly. – It all 
depends a lot on the prosecutor and his [sic] relationship with the prison 
commander. Perhaps it’s not that bad here, because Kyiv is near, and because we 
are in [the UkrPS’s showpiece]. But if you go a bit farther from Kyiv, it’s all a 
mere show. [For example] in Cherkasy a city prosecutor, a prison commander and 
the head of the city police [used to] go hunting together. Do you think the [city] 
prosecutor would allow a prosecutor for prisons to cause problems to the prison 
commander? [smiles sarcastically]. Over some random con?! It goes like that: you 
scratch my back – I’ll scratch yours. (Prisoner) 
 
The prisoners were likely right to be sceptical: following one of the weekly grievance fora 
the prosecutor summoned the officers and advised them how to write disciplinary reports 
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so that they would withstand a legal challenge (see Garland 1990: 255 on a ‘signifying 
practice’). Despite this often well-founded (see CAT, 2017: Para 37) cynicism, formal 
channels acted as ‘the input from the periphery’ (Pallot, 2015: 690) even during the Gulag, 
enabling Soviet prisoners to temper officer power through written grievances (Karklins, 
1989; Khlevniuk, 2004). As in Calavita and Jenness’s (2014) study, Ukrainian 
administrators tried to confine everything to the local level, avoiding ‘negative visibility’, 
i.e. external attention from the area manager’s office, monitoring bodies or the media (I 
discuss this in more detail in a subsequent section). I witnessed one deputy raging after 
learning of a prisoner’s new complaint to the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsman. 
The official was powerless to stop it because of the existing oversight that constrained his 
power. This reaction suggests that, despite the general pessimism, prisoners could employ 
structural provisions to check officer power.  
Feeling apprehensive about ‘negative visibility’, not least because many ‘pragmatic 
repetitive routines of daily practices’ (Garland, 1990: 255) in the prison violated the law 
(see Symkovych, 2018) and, if exposed in an official grievance, could cause problems, the 
administration applied the rule by law to ‘serial litigators’. Whereas the administration 
overlooked and relaxed many regime restrictions from practical necessity, not least 
because of understaffing, and for the comfort of officers and prisoners alike (Thomas, 
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1984), officers tended to be less discretionary with ‘frequent filers’ (Calavita and Jenness, 
2014: 27). The officers often cynically emphasised that they enforced a certain rule only 
because these prisoners ‘want[ed] everything to be according to the book’ (see King and 
Elliott, 1977). The unintended consequence of such repression was that these prisoners 
often felt emboldened and empowered because they interpreted coercion-in-response as the 
effectiveness of their pressure (Calavita and Jenness, 2014; see Sparks et al., 1996: 288 on 
a ‘mad litigious prisoner’). Furthermore, most front-line officers lacked training in 
completing reports and proved generally ignorant of legal issues, thus feeling vulnerable if 
officially challenged. The prisoners employed this structural weakness to fend off and 
dilute officer power. 
 
Force 
Prisoner use of force rests on a spectrum of factors (Bottoms, 1999; Sparks et al., 1996). 
Although an archetype of resistance, force often has only short-term effects over a limited 
number of people (e.g. Foucault, 1975; Hepburn, 1985; Karklins, 1989; Kauffman, 1988). 
Nevertheless, prisoners’ physical assaults on staff, as in other jurisdictions, constituted a 
real threat and had a direct bearing on officers’ exercise of their power (see Kauffman, 
1988; King and Elliott, 1977; Sparks et al., 1996).  
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Perilous understaffing, combined with the prison topography and en masse prisoner 
movement, sometimes enabled prisoners to assault officers with relative impunity: 
 
There was once a young práporschyk [patrol officer] unlocking the local zone 
gates when some sort of altercation erupted. Stupid of him – instead of backing 
down and perhaps returning with his partner, he was arguing with [a group of] 
prisoners. Somebody hit him from the back, then others added [punches]. When 
there was an inquiry, obviously nobody has seen nothing [the interviewee being 
sarcastic]. (Prisoner) 
 
This quotation illustrates that while prison life is replete with conflicts, amassed annoyance 
and frustration that can all easily escalate into violence (Sparks et al., 1996), prisoner 
power is not always ‘a defence of the weak’: it may be opportunistic, accidental resistance, 
if not predatory and selfish behaviour. As situated agents, prisoners often calculate cost-
effectiveness, and their generally, but not necessarily, rational actions may be devoid of 
political intentions or moral justifiability. Conversely, structural factors, whilst enabling 
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the prisoners to use force against staff, often diminished its rationality, as one ‘ordinary’ 
prisoner argued: 
 
Well, I can hit a práporschyk (patrol officer). I can kill him for that matter. What 
for? To spend the rest of my life in krýta (maximum-security prison)? What will 
this do for me? Nothing good. As it is, I will probably leave behind two years [i.e. 
will be released earlier]. They [officers] are not beasts. – Well, some of them want 
to show that you are nobody, but it’s because they are nobody. But there are other 
ways to show them this – hitting in the face is not smart, you won’t achieve 
anything – perhaps a second of joy, but then you’d be regretting. (Prisoner) 
 
Prison conditions have improved significantly compared to the repressive Soviet era and 
the 1990s, when prisons struggled to provide food or basic amenities, prisoner abuse was 
commonplace, and staff went without pay for months (see Piacentini, 2004). This living 
memory contrasted with improved conditions and staff-prisoner relations, rendering force 
less justifiable (see Cohen and Taylor, 1972 on collective memory; also Crewe, 2009; King 
and McDermott, 1995; Scraton et al., 1991). Furthermore, Ukraine’s ‘Europeanisation’ has 
led to shorter sentences with early release on parole more common. Empirical evidence 
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suggests that prisoners are more likely to transgress when they are still far from being 
released (Bottoms, 1999; see Garabedian, 1963 on ‘anticipatory socialization’). In 
addition, assaulting an officer could lead to an additional sentence. Whereas the threat of 
additional time fails as a deterrent when prisoners are already serving long sentences, 
especially when parole prospects are bleak (Kauffman, 1988; King and McDermott, 1995), 
the availability of parole meant many prisoners regarded force as too costly a means of 
resistance (see Crewe, 2009). 
Although prisoners aspired to parole, the use of force against staff was not 
unknown. While no incidents occurred during my fieldwork, my research participants 
shared stories about previous prisoner-staff physical confrontations in this and other 
prisons. The UkrPS and the Ukrainian media occasionally report serious physical assaults 
on prison staff: from spilling boiling water onto an officer’s face to a stabbing, and even 
murder (Radio Freedom, 21.08.2017; UkrPS, 28.02.2008; 27.04.2009; 10.06.2016).5 
Notwithstanding the standard caution about official figures, the UkrPS reported a total of 6 
cases of prisoner attacks on staff in 2017, including 2 in the research prison. Despite the 
fact that during the five months of my fieldwork, there were no officer assaults, officers 
were wary of these what Ugelvik (2014) terms ‘untrustworthy bodies’. Conscious of their 
vulnerability to opportunistic assault, officers did not usually indulge in ‘heroics’ by 
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restraining prisoners when alone (Kauffman, 1988). They had to use discretion when 
deploying their power, assessing the probability of prisoner physical resistance. Hence, 
whilst en masse housing, combined with serious understaffing, enabled prisoners to use 
force, the improved prison conditions, liberalised penal regime, and the potential for the 
state’s repressive backup (see Pallot and Piacentini, 2012) diminished the appeal of this 
form of resistance. Within these structural realities, neither side could remain completely 
powerful, nor permanently powerless and ‘defenceless’. Simultaneously, the penal regime 
directly mediated the form and frequency of prisoner resistance. 
 
Coercion 
Despite the law explicitly prohibiting prisoners’ defiance, especially strikes (Criminal-
Executive Code of Ukraine, 2003: Articles 9 , 107.4, and 118.4), prisoner non-compliance 
constituted a powerful, coercive tool.6 As in all social prisons (versus ‘electronic coffins’, 
King and Elliott, 1977: 3), the officers relied implicitly on prisoners’ co-operation to 
maintain the prison routine (Mathiesen, 1965; Sparks et al., 1996; Sykes, 1958). In this 
severely understaffed prison, an ever-present possibility of prisoners’ withdrawal of co-
operation posed a real threat that loomed large in the prison commander’s and officers’ 
minds. Whilst the prison possessed a ‘penal backup’ (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012) to 
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overcome any individual or collective non-compliance, its occurrence would disrupt 
‘smooth administration’ (Mathiesen, 1965: 54) and create the ‘negative visibility’ that the 
managers realistically feared ass I explain next.  
  
Collective coercion. Whilst existent, overt group non-compliance in Ukrainian prisons 
appears to be sporadic. The UkrPS reported one case of generic group disobedience, four 
cases of group food refusal, 10 cases of group self-harm, and  6 cases of ‘other high-profile 
emergences’ in 2017. Although unclear what exactly constituted ‘disobedience’ or ‘high-
profile emergency’, one UkrPS press release mentioned 100 prisoners refusing to carry out 
work (UkrPS, 15.08.2016). Although I did not observe open, collective protests during my 
fieldwork, several months before my arrival, a group of about 50 prisoners staged a hunger 
strike at this prison. This was to coerce the administration to transfer a newly arrived 
prisoner belonging to the prisoners’ hierarchical top level (see Symkovych, 2017c), to a 
prison of his choice. That crisis prompted a visit from the area manager’s office, individual 
‘prophylactic’ talks with each of the prisoners on strike, an agreement to transfer the 
prisoner in question, and eventually a new prison commander.  
Despite the apparent effectiveness of coercion through instigating ‘negative 
visibility’, several factors rendered collective, non-violent resistance less popular among 
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these prisoners. First, recent penal developments meant that Ukrainian prisoners had much 
more to gain than to lose from co-operation with officers, most notably the tacit 
institutionalised circumvention of many restrictive rules and the increased possibility of 
early release. Second, prison conditions and officer-prisoner relationships overall had 
significantly improved enough not to warrant frequent mass prisoner resistance (see 
Carrabine, 2005; Useem and Piehl, 2006; cf. King and Elliott, 1977). Third, the post-Soviet 
socio-legal reforms, together with demographic changes inside prisons, had been eroding 
group solidarity and the willingness to forfeit personal welfare for the collective good 
(Bosworth, 1996; Carrabine, 2005; Crewe, 2009; Mathiesen, 1965; Symkovych, 2017b). 
Whilst still holding power, the smotryáshchi, i.e. the confrontational leaders at the 
symbolic head of the informal prisoner hierarchy, had been losing their charismatic and 
traditional authority (Symkovych, 2017c; see Weber, 1962). That authority is central to 
organising and sustaining collective protests, as one experienced prisoner explained: 
 
If there is to be group disobedience, there should be an organiser. A person, or 
several, who will be a negotiator. He should be ready for the consequences – 
segregation cell, rozkrútka [additional sentence]. And these days they’ve got no 
guts (públika slabényka). Those 50 or something that [went on hunger strike], as 
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soon as the commission [from the area manager’s office] came, put their tails 
between the legs and all went for supper. Those who didn’t, were shipped out [to 
‘harsher’ prisons]. (Prisoner) 
 
A paradox emerges. On one hand, the administration held enough power to punish those 
prisoners who caused negative publicity. On the other hand, each instance of group 
disobedience de facto constituted a crisis, whereby the local managers faced serious 
repercussions. Almost without exception, the UkrPS released statements holding local 
administrators responsible for ‘substandard security and lack of professionalism’ 
immediately following reports of prisoner self-harm, suicide, escapes, fights, and any other 
manifestations of the breakdown in order and control. The press releases, normally 
nebulous, often contained passages like the following, attesting to the magnitude of the 
Soviet scapegoating culture: 
 
On [date] in the UkrPS Headquarters the UkrPS First Deputy held a meeting with 
the managers of [names] regions and commanders of [names of prisons] 
concerning serious shortcomings in security and professional work in the 
aforementioned establishments, and the emergency which took place in [name of 
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another prison] on [date]. The degree of guilt [sic] of the officials has been 
established; the actions to improve the state of affairs, to secure order, to prevent 
and debar negative tendencies and conflict situations amidst prisoners have been 
outlined (UkrPS, 05.06.2008; also UkrPS, 25.01.2010; 09.03.2010). 
 
Even though the UkrPS officially denied problems in a particular establishment and 
framed each instance of prisoner non-compliance as prisoner attempts at coercion, my 
analysis of UkrPS press releases over four years suggests that, typically, prison 
commanders were chastised for lapses in control (e.g. UkrPS, 05.07.2010; 14.07.2010). 
Following the Soviet legacy of official denial, most reported official inquiries did ‘not find 
facts substantiating prisoners’ grievances’ that triggered non-compliance. Nevertheless, 
prison and area administrators were still ‘called to account’ – thus demonstrating that 
prisoner coercion through engaging the administration’s fear of ‘negative visibility’ could 
be effective (e.g. UkrPS, 08.08.2007; 26.08.2009; also CPT, 2015a, 2015b). 
  
Individual coercion. Although structurally ‘weaker’ than the state’s penal might, prisoners 
managed to successfully counteract staff power, collectively and individually. However, 
the resources for individual resistance, apart from official grievances and physical force, 
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were scarce. Within these structural constraints, some prisoners used their bodies as an 
ultimate resource to resist officer power (see also McDermott and King, 1988 and Sparks 
et al., 1996 on ‘dirty protests’). One prominent coercive tactic was self-harm (cf. Crewe, 
2009 on ‘muppets’ and ‘weakness’).  
Self-harm and suicide in custody are complex phenomena (Liebling, 1992) and may 
serve as a final assertion of agency in a struggle where ‘further compromise, further retreat 
becomes a total and complete surrender’ (McDermott and King, 1988: 373). Indeed, the 
UkrPS framed prisoner self-harm as manipulative behaviour: the official press releases 
unwaveringly explained disclosed self-harm incidents as prisoners’ attempts ‘to avoid 
justified punishment’ and coerce staff (e.g. UkrPS 18.08.2010; 14.05.2010). The Prison 
Byelaws (2014) explicitly prohibit self-harm and, to emphasise the framing of self-harm as 
prisoners’ manipulation and coercion, stipulate that if taken to the medical ward from a 
punishment cell or a segregation unit following self-harm, prisoners had to return to 
segregation to complete the prescribed term (Rule xxvii: 5; cf. Kauffman, 1988). Having 
no relevant training, officers appeared oblivious to the possibility of alternative reasons for 
prisoner self-harm.7 Few officers perceived self-harm as a genuine attempt to get help or 
‘escape’ (Dear et al., 2000), but rather considered it to be a manipulative attention-seeking, 
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evasion of punishment, or pursuit of other selfish ends, i.e. a purely instrumental form of 
prisoner power: 
 
It is one of the methods used to influence the administration. (Psychologist) 
 
They open up (vskryváyutysya) [cut open veins] to get attention. They know this 
will cause fuss, TV will report [it], human rights activists will be screaming that 
prisoners have again opened up to protest against the ‘inhumane conditions’ and 
atrocious staff. – They’re like kids. – As a rule, they open up when they know 
they’ll [have to] go to the seg block. Look, they’re not going to die. If they really 
wanted, they would. They’d cut veins in the armpit so you can’t stop blood. But 
they just scratch. They want attention, – and perhaps a ‘holiday’ in the medical 
ward. (Patrol officer) 
 
As with other forms of prisoner power, some men occasionally self-harmed ‘effectively’ to 
circumvent official rules. Prior to my fieldwork, the prison commander reassigned a squad 
supervisor when five prisoners cut their wrists to protest at this officer’s legal, albeit 
coercive, demands. I observed other situations when prisoners threatened to cut their veins. 
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This ‘strategy of despair’ (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012: 115) was effective at both the 
individual and group level despite official trivialisation and the authorities’ assertion that 
they would not submit to prisoner manipulation. Like other modes of resistance, it 
exploited the administration’s fear of ‘negative visibility’ and the Soviet legacy of 
hierarchical blame-assignment coupled with displacement of responsibility: 
 
It is our Soviet way. There always should be an appointed scapegoat. So if a 
prisoner commits suicide, the heads of a psychologist, zampolít [Deputy], perhaps 
even a prison commander’s and deputy area manager’s would roll. There is always 
reason to justify: ‘shortcoming in work’, ‘poor preventive work’, ‘official 
negligence’, whatever. It’s out of your control, but you would surely lose your 
bonus for that month at best, or you can be reprimanded, have promotion delayed 
or even be fired. (Psychologist)  
 
The media attention to such crises added weight to the impact of self-harm. Cognisant of 
the powerful effect negative publicity had on the prison administration, prisoners 
sometimes alerted the media and human rights groups through illicit mobile phones or 
relatives about individual, or more often group, self-harm. The prison authorities always 
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challenged such reports, labelling them as prisoner manipulation and, at times, accused 
human rights activists and the media of being mouthpieces or puppets of the criminal 
world (e.g. UkrPS, 25.10.2008; 08.07.2009). Establishing the truth in the absence of 
unbiased investigators poses an insurmountable challenge given the partiality of the UkrPS 
and many prisoner-rights activists, not to mention the sensationalist tendencies of the mass 
media in Ukraine. Yet the cumulative result was effective pressure on the UkrPS. The 
tangible desire of the administration to minimise external attention, even more so external 
intervention, emerged in many conversations and reactions (see Hepburn, 1984; Karklins, 
1989; Sparks et al., 1996). 
Many of my prisoner interlocutors concurred with the dominant view of self-harm as 
manipulation. However, some confided that in the past, they had self-inflicted bleeding not 
for selfish gains, but to halt police brutality (see CAT, 2017; CPT, 2017). The story of this 
prisoner librarian reflects the similar experience of several other prisoners with whom I 
spoke: 
 
When I was in a district police department (rayotdél) they were beating me with 
fists and batons. When I felt that I cannot stand it anymore I bit the skin open to 
bleed when the officers stepped out to have a cigarette. (Prisoner) 
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Whilst truly a desperate ‘defence of the weak’, self-harm proved effective – and prisoners 
assured me they would use it as a last resort if needed. However, their objective was not to 
seek attention or extra privileges, but to defend their basic rights. I saw scars resulting from 
self-harm on the wrists and forearms of at least ten prisoners. The UkrPS reported a 
staggering 431 cases of self-harm in 2016, of which nine were in the research prison (17 in 
2017). Even if prisoners did self-harm as coercion or punishment-evasion, we should 
wonder how severe the punishment was that could provoke this extreme form of ‘defence’. 
It highlights the personal cost for people inside this radically unequal power relationship. 
Although prisoners, individually and collectively, exploited the structural legacy of the 
Soviet scapegoating culture, this power contest resembled a war of attrition where 
managers and prisoners alike could be removed. However, for prisoners this removal 
usually meant a higher security category, additional custody, informal punishment by the 
administration, or, in extreme cases, death. 
 
Conclusions 
The fact that, while being structurally subordinate, prisoners are not entirely powerless, 
constitutes a well-known paradox (inter alia, Crewe, 2009; Mathiesen, 1965; Sykes, 1958). 
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Examining how prisoners, borrowing from Mathiesen, ‘defended’ themselves in this 
Ukrainian prison, I have demonstrated that, in line with accounts from elsewhere, the 
prisoners in my study daily contested officer power in multiple ways, often visibly and 
consequentially. Couched within these prisoner actions were various causes, intentions, 
meanings, and outcomes. Whilst for the benefit of space I have omitted other modes of 
prisoner response to imprisonment in general and officer power in particular and focused 
only on those most consequential and mutually acknowledged as forms of resistance,8 the 
study demonstrates that dividing the prison population into the omnipotent powerful and 
the docile powerless is too simplistic (Bosworth, 1996; Kauffman, 1988; Mathiesen, 1965; 
Sykes, 1958). 
The case of Ukraine, where the enduring Soviet legacies cohere with substantial 
democratisation and liberalising reforms, offers an instructive example of the mutual 
constitution of human agency and social structure (Gangas, 2016; Giddens, 1984; Rubin, 
2017). Using official grievances as one example, I have demonstrated that rather than 
being an oppositional binary, structure and agency constantly interacted, working to 
transform each other. The Ukraine’s ‘de-Communisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ project re-
constituted agents, augmenting a realisation by some prisoners of their citizenship and 
rights-bearing subjectivity. This structurally amplified rights-consciousness enabled these 
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prisoners, combining with another structural factor of officers’ common legal illiteracy, to 
fend off officer power and reconstitute the internal structures of the prison’s power 
dynamics. Even so, the entrenched, repressive penal culture (Piacentini and Katz, 2017) 
and its translation into prison ethos and folkways (Garland, 1990), together with the legacy 
of ordinary citizens’ ‘internal colonisation’ (Shearer, 2015) by the state and its colluding 
branches, diminished the capability (Gangas, 2016) and readiness of many prisoners to 
pursue a legally sanctioned form of resistance through official grievances. Conversely, by 
invoking the concept of ‘negative visibility’, I have advanced the case for the interplay of a 
local political culture with prisoner resistance. I have shown how the prisoners employed 
the resilient Soviet tradition of hierarchical blame assignment and displacement of 
responsibility to undermine, circumvent, and fend off officer power. Thus, whilst the forms 
of prisoner resistance described resembled those in other jurisdictions, the underlying 
mechanisms and their pertinence reflected the local political ethos. 
Prisoners actively engaged with structures, evaluating them, accepting and using 
some, whilst challenging others; thus they reinvented or reaffirmed themselves as 
autonomous, capable agents (Gangas, 2016; Giddens, 1984; Rubin, 2017; Ugelvik, 2014).9 
Although power operated on many levels, in concrete and diffused forms alike, my 
practical focus on power relations between prisoners and officers revealed that concrete 
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and immediate power on the ground entails equally tangible and front-stage resistance. 
Heeding Rubin’s (2015; 2017) warning regarding the conflation of ‘frictions’ and 
resistance, I limited the discussion here to political examples of acknowledged and 
consequential prisoner resistance. I have demonstrated that prisoner power does not 
constitute exclusively a ‘defence’ against officer brutality and repressive regimes. 
Prisoners exploited structural factors, primarily the culture of scapegoating and the 
administration’s profound avoidance of ‘negative visibility’ and blame. They also had 
instrumental, selfish reasons, thus cautioning against the over-romanticisation of the 
‘defences of the weak’ or a priori politicisation of prisoners’ resistance. As situated actors, 
prisoners and officers often calculated the cost-effectiveness of their (re)actions – and 
structural factors (e.g. understaffing interacting with the prison’s topography) had a direct 
bearing on these (sometimes opportunistic) decisions, as I underscore in my discussion of 
force as a resistance tactic.10 This analysis also has illustrated that structure can 
simultaneously enable and constrain, comprising both means and outcomes of agents’ 
interactions (see Gangas, 2016 on capability expansion and Giddens, 1984 on 
transformative capacity and duality of structure). 
Countries’ penal regimes, in general, and individual prisons within them, differ 
enormously in their punitiveness, violence, and how much leverage prisoners enjoy in 
35 
 
power competition and inter-subjective relations (Calavita and Jenness, 2014; Crewe, 
2009; Kauffman, 1988; King and McDermott, 1995; Liebling, 2004; McDermott and King, 
1988; Pallot and Piacentini, 2012; Sparks et al., 1996). As a case study within an atypical, 
‘showcase’ prison, the findings presented and arguments proposed require some caution. 
Nonetheless, listening to the prisoners’ accounts of their experiences in other prisons, and 
from sustained conversations during five months’ living in the UkrPS Training Academy 
with officers from across Ukraine, the findings seem to replicate the situation in other 
Ukrainian medium-security prisons for sentenced men (‘correctional colonies’).11 Despite 
the study’s limitations, using the case of Ukraine, a country that has undergone dramatic 
structural changes whilst retaining many Soviet remnants, has exposed the complex 
relationship and mutual constitution of structure and agency and the interplay of a 
managerial culture and prisoner resistance. 
 Finally, although I framed this discussion using the schematic opposition of 
prisoners and officers, I recognise that both groups have their own hierarchies and 
demonstrate important heterogeneity (Crewe, 2009; Goffman, 1961; Hollander and 
Einwohner, 2004; Mathiesen, 1965). I also acknowledge that a prisoner’s decision not to 
contest officer power or prison regime is by no means a suggestion of their limited agency 
(Bosworth and Carrabine, 2001; Rubin, 2015). To summarise, power in prison is 
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multidirectional and provisional, whereas actors’ resources and capabilities are transient 
and contingent. They predicate on history (living memories), political and managerial 
tradition (common-sense practices, state branches’ collusion, and hierarchical displacement 
of blame), and legal framework (‘Europeanisation’-inspired normative expectations and 
external monitoring). Thus, notwithstanding the structural determinants of the inherent 
gross power imbalance, the interactional nature of power meant that neither of the 
schematic parties was completely powerful, nor permanently powerless or ‘defenceless’.  
 
Notes 
1. Frictions can be interpreted as, or develop into, resistance, but academics tend a priori 
or ex post facto to conflate them (Carrabine, 2005; Rubin, 2015, 2017). For examples of 
this borderline friction-adaptation-resistance see Crewe (2009), Pallot and Piacentini 
(2012), Reed (2003), Thomas (1984), Ugelvik (2014). 
2. From a total 1,188 ECtHR judgments against Ukraine since its accession to the Council 
of Europe in 1995, the greatest number concerns the state’s violation of the right to a fair 
trial (529) and length of proceedings (353), as well as inhuman and degrading treatment 
(170) and right to effective remedy (247), illustrating the entrenched failures of the 
Ukrainian justice and law-enforcement systems (ECtHR, 2018b). 
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3. See Piacentini (2004) and Calavita and Jenness (2014) on the benefits of outsider status 
in prison research. 
4. Naturally, there are many other forms, not least manipulation, persuasion, inducement or 
censoriousness (e.g. Kauffman, 1988; Mathiesen, 1965; Thomas, 1984). 
5. Following each reorganisation, the UkrPS website lost part of its archive. Since the 
UkrPS’s complete merger into the Ministry of Justice in 2016, the Ministry stopped 
publishing prison-related information, even hitherto customary statistics. I draw on the 
press releases that formerly appeared on the UkrPS website and list those still retrievable 
in the References. 
6. I define coercion as physically nonviolent whereby another person’s behaviour is 
manipulated by means that bring negative consequences other than physical force. This 
includes the actual recourse to such means and expressed or perceived threats to use them 
(Bachman, Smith, and Slesinger, 1966). 
7. One exception was, in official parlance, a ‘loss of socially significant connections on the 
outside’ as a reason for suicide, although in some cases, staff recognised alternative 
reasons, notably, shame and refusal to accept a downgrade in prisoner hierarchy following 
the inability to honour a gambling debt (Symkovych, 2017b). The UkrPS reported 8 
suicides in 2017, including two in the research prison.  
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8. Here I refer to Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004) taxonomy. Furthermore, I have 
described only those tactics used as resistance tools not merely as a means to derive benefit 
or pleasure per se (Rubin, 2015). 
9. Elsewhere I demonstrate that whilst populating a different from the prisoners’ end of the 
nexus of penal power, power-holders also evaluate and resist the penal structures, not 
merely embracing or using them uncritically (Symkovych, 2018). Similarly, Khlevniuk 
(2004) cites stark examples of street-level bureaucrats resisting repressive penal policies to 
reduce the Stalinist effect on ordinary citizens. See also Karklins (1989). 
10. This does not imply that people always constitute prudential agents, nor that actions 
inevitably bring about their intended consequences. 
11. All my respondents concurred that the power dynamics in remand prisons (SIZO) differ 
enormously from those in training prisons. Likewise, the maximum-security sectors 
housing life-sentenced prisoners who do not associate with prisoners from other cells must 
produce a different type of order and power relations; as must prisons where the managing 
team instils a climate of fear and intimidation (CPT, 2015a; 2017). 
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